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COMMENT 
THE GOVERNMENT WE DESERVE? DIRECT DEMOCRACY, 
OUTRAGED MAJORITIES, AND THE DECLINE OF JUDICIAL 
INDEPENDENCE 
ANDREA SPECHT* 
Omnipotence in itself seems to me a bad and dangerous thing . ... 
Therefore, when I see the right and wherewithal to do all ac-
corded to any power whatsoever, whether it be called people or 
king, democracy or aristocracy, and whether it be exercised in a 
monarchy or a republic, I say, therein lies the seed of tyranny, 
and I seek to live elsewhere, under different laws. 1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Frustrated by the perceived ineffectiveness and unresponsiveness of 
their elected representatives? Americans are increasingly enamored of di-
rect democracy as a means to advance their public policy agendas. The 
tools of direct democracy include the direct initiative, which allows citizens 
to enact new statutes or constitutional amendments; the indirect initiative, 
which allows citizens to direct their elected representatives to do the same; 
the popular referendum, which allows citizens to repeal a statute enacted by 
the state legislature; and the recall, which allows citizens to remove an 
elected official before the end of his or her term? From 1991 to 2000, 389 
statewide initiatives appeared on ballots across the country,4 up 44 percent 
* J.D .• University of St. Thomas School of Law, 2006; B.A. Macalester College, 1992. I 
thank Dr. Charles Reid for his suggestions and encouragement. 
1. ALExIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA vol. 1, pt. 2, ch. 7, 290 (Arthur 
Goldhammer trans., The Library of America 2004). 
2. Caroline J. Tolbert, Public Policy and Direct Democracy in the Twentieth Century: The 
More Things Change, the More They Stay the Same, in THE BATILE OVER CITIZEN LAWMAKING 
35,38--40 (M. Dane Waters, ed., Carolina Academic Press 2(01). 
3. See, e.g. JOHN HAsKELL, DIRECT DEMOCRACY OR REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT: DIS-
PELLING THE POPUUST MYTH 48-49 (Westview Press 2(01); DAVID B. MAGLEBY, DIRECT LEGIS-
LATION: VOTING ON BALLOT PROPOSITIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 35-36 (Johns Hopkins Univ. 
Press 1984); M. DANE WATERS, INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM ALMANAC 11 (Carolina Academic 
Press 2(03) [hereinafter I and R Almanac]. Unless otherwise stated, this comment is concerned 
with the direct initiative and the popular referendum only. 
4. I and R Almanac, supra note 3, at 533 (App. D). It is important to distinguish statewide 
initiatives (and referenda) from their local equivalents, which are available to residents of 
thousands of American counties, cities, and towns. INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM INsTlTUTE, INITI. 
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from the preceding decade and 33 percent from the previous record set in 
the years 1911 to 1920.5 While advocates and opponents debate the desira-
bility of this trend and what it portends, none dispute that the instruments of 
direct democracy are powerful, if also blunt. 6 
The initiative and referendum are powerful because they enable the 
majority to determine the content and scope of minority rights; they are 
blunt because they enable citizen lawmakers to act without the constraints 
and incentives that temper their elected representatives. As direct democ-
racy expands, the risk therefore grows that a tyranny of the majority will 
emerge, eclipsing the rights 7 of persons outside the American mainstream. 
While direct democracy proponents are inclined to downplay this risk, data 
from recent studies confirm the growing vulnerability of persons of color, 
gays and lesbians, non-English speakers, and other "outsiders." This vulner-
ability in tum implicates a seemingly unavoidable irony of direct democ-
racy: the more common policymaking by plebiscite becomes, the more 
frequently the judiciary-Le., the "least democratic branch" of government, 
is called upon to uphold minority rights.8 
The judiciary confronts significant risk in fulfilling its obligations in 
this regard. Americans are captivated by an increasingly totalitarian brand 
of politics that targets judicial review and the judges who employ it as 
problems in their own right. The uproar over ''judicial activism"9 is sympto-
matic of the overall politicization of the judiciary-a trend caused in part by 
interest group influence over state judicial elections lO and at the federal 
level, partisan exploitation of the judicial nomination process by Republi-
ATIVE AND REFERENDUM IN THE UNTIED STATES: A PluMER 5 (M. Dane Waters, ed., Citizen 
Lawmaker Press 2(02), available at http://iandrinstitute.orglNew%20IRI%20Website%20InfolI& 
R %20Research%20and%20HistorylI&R %20StudiesIW aters%20-%20I&R %20Primer%2OCom-
plete%20IRI.pdf. Many jurisdictions that do not have statewide plebiscites (including Texas and 
New York) allow local units of government to facilitate citizen lawmaking.ld. In fact, one-third to 
one-half of all American cities-including fifteen of the twenty largest-allow local initiatives. 
John G. Matsusaka, I & R in American Cities: Basic Patterns, in I and R Almanac. supra note 3, 
at 31, 36. This comment addresses direct democracy at the statewide level only. 
5. I and R Almanac, supra note 3, at 533. 
6. See, e.g. Robin Charlow, Judicial Review. Equal Protection and the Problem with Plebi-
scites. 79 CORNELL L. REv. 527,537 (1994) (noting that in contrast to the representative system, 
initiatives and referenda allow "only isolated [yes/no] votes on single issues"); Michael Vitiello & 
Andrew I. Glendon, Article III Judges and the Initiative Process: Are Article III Judges Hope-
lessly Elitist?, 31 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1275, 1288 (1998) (noting that "the initiative process does 
not allow for modification or compromise" when new information emerges). 
7. For the purposes of tbis comment, the term "rights" denotes "civil rights" as defined by 
Black's Law Dictionary: "The individual rights of personal liberty guaranteed by the Bill of 
Rights and by the 13th, 14th, 15th, and 19th Amendments, as well as by legislation such as the 
Voting Rights Act. Civil rights include esp. the right to vote, the right of due process, and the right 
of equal protection under the law." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 263 (8th ed. 2004). 
8. See, e.g., RICHARD J. ELLIS, DEMOCRATIC DELUSIONS: THE INITIATIVE PROCESS IN 
AMERICA 176 (Univ. Press of Kansas 2(02). 
9. See infra note 102. 
10. See infra note 130. 
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cans and Democrats alike. 11 More fundamentally, the growing politicization 
of state and federal courts arises from an erroneous belief among Americans 
that judges are (or should be) accountable in the same way legislators and 
executives are-in other words, that their decisions should be "constituent-
driven."12 
The convergence and interplay of these two trends-the expansion of 
direct democracy on the one hand and the increasing politicization of the 
courts on the other-foreshadow a troubling period in the evolution of our 
society. The influence of well-financed interest groups over both plebiscites 
and judicial elections in key states is of particular concern, but the larger 
issue is Americans' growing inability to recognize the value of courts as 
necessarily counter-majoritarian guardians of the Constitution. This com-
ment will summarize the history of direct democracy in the United States 
and reflect on the connections between plebiscites, minority rights, and the 
decline of judicial independence. It ultimately concludes that unless we re-
examine our unqualified fidelity to "majority rule," Americans may lose the 
very essence of the democracy we strive to maintain. 
II. DIRECT DEMOCRACY, MINORITY RIGHTS, AND 
THE ROLE OF THE COURTS 
A. The Rise of Direct Democracy in the United States 
Direct democracy first emerged as a prominent influence on the Amer-
ican political scene as part of the Progressive Movement in the early 
1900s.13 The Progressives sought to end the growing influence that big bus-
iness and party bosses exercised over state legislatures and elected officials, 
and to reclaim politics for the common man.14 The Progressives' broader 
aim was, in the words of one writer, to restore the "civic purity"15 they 
associated with "America's mythic roots."16 This idealistic vision suc-
11. David A. Yalof, Dress Rehearsal Politics and the Case of Earmarked Judicial Nominees, 
26 CARDOZO L. REv. 691, 691-94 (2005) (discussing the trend toward more prolonged and ideo-
logically charged confirmation processes for federal judges). 
12. Paul J. DeMuniz, Judicial Selection in Oregon: Money, Politics, and the Initiative Pro-
cess, 39 WILLAME'ITE L. REv. 1265, 1265-66 (2003). See also infra notes 145-51 and accompa-
nying text. 
13. MAGLEBY, supra note 3, at 21. 
14. Id. at 21-22. 
15. Nathaniel A. Persily, The Peculiar Geography of Direct Democracy: Why the Initiative, 
Referendum, and Recall Developed in the American West, 2 MICH. L. & POL'y REv. 11. 18 (1997) 
(quoting Richard Hofstadter, The Age of Reform: From Bryan to F.D.R.5-6 (1955». 
16. Id (associating New England town hall meetings with these "mythic roots"). It is impor-
tant to note that the Progressives were not the only turn of the century reformers to idealize the 
common man and his place in American democracy. Key elements of Progressive ideology are 
traceable to the Populists, who were active in the rural South and Midwest through the 1890s. 
HASKELL. supra note 3. at 28-29. Deeper treatments of direct democracy's origins discuss both 
groups and differentiate their approaches: while Populists advocated direct democracy as a re-
placement for representative government. Progressives saw it as an improvement on the existing 
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ceeded in capturing the public imagination and inspiring an enduring leg-
acy: from 1898 to 1918, twenty-two states amended their constitutions to 
incorporate one or more instruments of direct democracy. 17 
For the Progressives, direct democracy was both a good unto itself and 
a vehicle for advancing a particular policy agenda. 18 Convinced that gov-
ernment action was necessary to mitigate the socially destructive conse-
quences of industrialism, they promoted reforms ranging from minimum 
wage, antitrust, and food safety regulations to Prohibition, women's suf-
frage and the graduated income tax. 19 To the extent that legislatures be-
holden to corporate interests were certain to reject many of these reforms on 
principle, direct democracy was a critical vehicle for achieving social 
change. In essence, direct democracy made legislatures moot by empower-
ing average citizens to directly enact and repeal state laws. 
The Progressives won their first victory for direct democracy in South 
Dakota, which adopted the statewide initiative in 1898.10 Utah, Oregon, and 
other states followed over the next twenty years, with North Dakota becom-
ing the last of nineteen jurisdictions21 to place this powerful lawmaking tool 
in citizens' hands before World War I temporarily halted the direct democ-
racy movement.22 It was not until 1956 that another state (Alaska) adopted 
the statewide initiative,23 followed by Wyoming in 1968 and Illinois and 
Florida in 1970 and 1972, respectively.14 In 1992, Mississippi became the 
twenty-fourth and most recent state to incorporate initiative lawmaking.1s 
Twenty-one of the twenty-four jurisdictions that allow statewide initiatives 
system. See, e.g., Kenneth P. Miller, Courts as Watchdogs of the Washington State Initiative 
Process, 24 SEATILE U. L. REv. 1053, 1058-60 (2001). Miller posits that these distinctions con-
tinue in the debate over direct democracy today, with contemporary Populists striking a more 
radical anti-government tone than their Progressive, "good government" counterparts-many of 
whom are growing increasingly disenchanted with citizen lawmaking. Id. 
17. Persily, supra note 15, at 15. 
18. Id. at 22-23; THOMAS E. CRONIN, DIRECT DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICS OF INmATIVE, 
REFERENDUM, AND REcALL 58-59 (Harvard Univ. Press 1989); TOLBERT, supra note 2, at 40. 
19. CRONIN, supra note 18, at 58-59. 
20. I and R Almanac, supra note 3, at 12. 
21. Id. 
22. Fearing the implications of Gennan aggression for the U.S., Americans lost their taste for 
civic experimentation and equated patriotism "with defense of the status quo rather than its altera-
tion." Id. at 4 (quoting CARL H. CHRISLOCK, THE PROGRESSIVE ERA IN MINNESOTA 1899-1918 
(Minn. Hist. Soc'y 1971». 
23. Id. at 6 (noting that Alaska's constitution provided for the initiative and referendum when 
the Union admitted it in 1959). 
24. Id. at 12. 
25. Id. Jurisdictions with the direct statutory and/or constitutional initiative are Alaska, Ari-
zona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, 
Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, 
South Dakota, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming.Id. The most active states, in tenns of number of 
statewide initiatives on the ballot from 1904 to 2002, are Oregon, California, Colorado, North 
Dakota, and Arizona, respectively. Id. at 8. 
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today also have popular referenda,26 while three states allow the latter 
alone.27 
Initiative use has fluctuated greatly over the past one hundred years.28 
It declined steadily from the Progressives' heyday through the 1970s,29 then 
rebounded dramatically after Californians enacted the widely publicized 
and controversial Proposition 13 in 1978.30 In the 1980s, 289 statewide ini-
tiatives appeared on ballots across the country; in the nineties, the total leapt 
to a record 396.31 Although initiative use appears to be decreasing slightly 
in the first decade of the twenty-first century,32 some of the most divisive 
and important policy questions of the foreseeable future, includingques-
tions of constitutional rights, will undoubtedly be decided by citizen 
lawmakers.33 
Numerous factors have contributed to the dramatic growth of direct 
democracy over the past quarter-century. Activists on the political Left and 
Right have discovered that regardless of whether initiatives or referenda 
pass, the campaigns and intense media coverage surrounding them generate 
broad popular awareness of the underlying issues.34 The awareness in tum 
26. Id. 
27. I and R Almanac, supra note 3, at 12 (noting that citizens of Kentucky, Maryland, and 
New Mexico can repeal state laws via the popular referendum but cannot place statewide initia-
tives on the ballot). 
28. David Magleby, Taking the Initiative: Direct Legislation and Direct Democracy in the 
I980s, 21 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 600, 603 (1988); M. Dane Waters, Testimony before the Califor-
nia Commission on the Initiative Process, THE INlTIATIVE PROCESS IN AMERICA: AN OVERVIEW OF 
How IT WORKS AROUND TIlE COUNTRY 2 (Dec. 18,2000), available at http://www.cainitiative. 
orglpdf/initiative_process_iri.pdf (last visited Apr. 2, 2007). 
29. Waters, supra note 28, at 2. 
30. Proposition 13, which sharply limited the power of local governments to tax, became a 
catalyst for a nationwide "taxpayer revolt" and the direct democracy movement in general. 
CRONIN, supra note 18, at 3-4; I and R Almanac, supra note 3, at 6; MAGLEBY, supra note 3, at 
5-6. 
31. Waters, supra note 28, at 3. 
32. I and R Almanac, supra note 3, at 8. The decrease comes in spite of broad popular 
support for citizen lawmaking. According to various polls, somewhere between two-thirds and 
three-quarters of citizens favor the opportunity to vote on statewide ballot propositions. Julian N. 
Eule, Judicial Review of Direct Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1503, 1507 n. 16 (1990); Waters, supra 
note 28, at 3. One survey found that as many as eighty-five percent of Californians thought that 
voting on ballot propositions was "a good idea." MAGLEBY, supra note 3, at 9. Notwithstanding 
the initiative's popularity, observers attribute its slowing (or at least static) usage rate to increased 
regulation of direct democracy processes. I and R Almanac, supra note 3, at 8-9. 
33. Kenneth P. Miller, The Courts and the Initiative Process, in I and R Almanac, supra note 
3, at 459; see also, I and R Almonac, supra note 3, at 8-9; Eric Lane, Men are Not Angels: The 
Realpolitik of Direct Democracy and What We Can Do about It, 34 WILLAMEITE L. REv. 579, 
582-83 (1998). 
34. David B. Magleby, Let the Voters Decide? An Assessment of the Initiative and Referen-
dum Process, 66 U. COLO. L. REv. 13,28-29 (1995); Magleby, supra note 28, at 604. An espe-
cially brazen use of the initiative to boost an issue's visibility is evident in circumstances where 
interest groups draft and sponsor ballot items they know to be unconstitutional and therefore 
doomed to failure in a post-election court challenge. See Daniel M. Warner, Direct Democracy: 
The Right of the People to Make Fools of Themselves; The Use and Abuse of Initiative and 
Referendum, A Local Government Perspective, 19 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 47, 60-65 (1995). 
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catapults the issues onto local and national policy agendas.35 Candidates for 
statewide office endorse and sponsor initiatives to benefit their cam-
paigns,36 and sitting legislators use initiatives to avoid voting on divisive 
issues, in favor of "let[ting] the voters decide.'>37 Other factors include the 
growth of a highly profitable initiative industry;38 increasing voter hostility 
toward government itself;39 the career-launching potential of initiatives for 
individual activists;40 the emergence of counter-propositions on ballots;41 
the appeal of direct democracy's immediate and tangible impact on public 
policy (relative to candidate elections);42 and rapidly changing 
demographics.43 
From 1898 through the 1980s, initiatives across the country were dis-
tributed relatively equally among issue categories such as housing, taxation, 
business regulation, public health, morality, and welfare.44 These categories 
continue to reflect the topics initiatives address, but since the late 1970s, a 
majoritarian backlash against the progress of minorities has significantly 
influenced the overall direction of citizen lawmaking.45 The most provoca-
tive data establish that when minority rights are the express subjects of bal-
35. Magleby, supra note 34, at 28-29; see also, Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas, Judicial Review of 
Initiatives and Referenda in which Majorities Vote on Minorities' Democratic Citizenship, 60 
OHIO ST. LJ. 399,471-472 (1999). Even failed initiatives appear to have an additional and so-
cially destructive "side effect": increasing public animosity toward unpopular minorities. See. e.g., 
William E. Adams, Jr., Is It Animus or a Difference of Opinion? The Problems Caused by the 
Invidious Intent of Anti-Gay Ballot Measures, 34 WILLAMETrB L. REv. 449, 468-70 (1998) (dis-
cussing the correlation between initiative campaigns and increases in hate crimes perpetrated 
against gay men and lesbians). 
36. ELLIS, supra note 8, at 80 (noting the "increasingly prominent role" elected officials and 
candidates play in authoring and/or sponsoring initiatives). 
37. Id. 
38. Magleby, supra note 34, at 30-31. 
39. MAGLEBY, supra note 3, at 14-15. 
40. Id. 
41. Todd Donovan & Shaun Bowler, An Overview of Direct Democracy in the States, in 
CITIZENS AS LEGISLATORS I, 10 (Ohio St. Univ. Press, 1998) (defining a counterproposal as "a 
rapidly qualified initiative designed to deflect attention from an opponent's initiative"). 
42. Magleby, supra note 34, at 30-31. 
43. See Caroline J. Tolbert & Rodney E. Hero, English-Only Laws and Direct Legislation: 
The Battle in the States over Language Minority Rights, 7 J.L. & POL. 325, 325-327 nn.l0-11 
(1990) (noting that many commentators view the "English-only movement" as a backlash against 
an increasing number of immigrants, and citing the exclusive reliance of "English-only propo-
nents" on direct democracy instruments over "a mix of legislative, administrative, and judicial 
action"). 
44. Magleby, supra note 28, at 603. 
45. See Lazos Vargas, supra note 35, at 421 ("In the late 19708 and early 1980s, initiatives 
and referendUIns increasingly became a democratic device through which majorities opposed inte-
gration and anti-discrimination laws."); Adams, supra note 35, at 458 ("During the past two de-
cades, the number of ballot measures aimed at limiting or reversing legal protections of lesbians 
and gay men have proliferated."); HASKELL, supra note 3, at 109 (discussing journalist Peter 
Schrag's argument that Californians' predilection for tax-cutting initiatives reflects "an effort by 
the white middle class to reassert its control over California politics ... just when ethnic minori-
ties are finally able to wield some power in the legislature .... "). 
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lot propositions, citizens vote to limit or eliminate those rights as often as 
eight out of ten times.46 
B. Direct Democracy and Minority Rights 
Among the many arguments for and against direct democracy,47 one of 
the most widely debated questions is whether direct democracy infringes 
minority rights at a rate greater than representative democracy.48 Some of 
the disagreement stems from the absence of a uniform definition of "minor-
ity" in this context.49 A lack of empirical data showing how minority rights 
fare in legislatures relative to plebiscites adds further ambiguity. In spite of 
these complexities, analyses drawing on thirty years of experience with the 
initiative and referendum are beginning to compel the conclusion that for 
many minority groups, "the more direct democracy becomes, the more 
threatening it is.''50 
In a widely cited 1978 article, Professor Derrick Bell, Jr., argues that 
Americans' increasing reliance on direct democracy portends a crisis for 
racial and other minoritiesY According to Bell, the rise of citizen lawmak-
ing is problematic for two reasons. First, the pervasive nature of racism in 
America compels low-income whites to prioritize "[p]reserving white supe-
riority" above "mounting a unified attack" on the economic advantages that 
affluent whites have over both blacks and poor whites. 52 Second, unlike 
their elected representatives, voters may act on racial motivations alone; 
they are unencumbered by professional aspirations and unmotivated by 
practical incentives to compromise with fellow lawmakers. 53 For Bell, the 
convergence of racism and referenda yields an all too predictable result: 
when white voters have the opportunity to repeal any law remediating racial 
disparity, they seize it.54 Bell observes that 
46. Laws Vargas, supra note 35, at 399. 
47. A discussion of these arguments (outside of those touching on the issue of minority 
rights) is beyond the scope of this comment but widely available in the literature on direct democ-
racy. See e.g. CRONIN, supra note 18, at 10-12; MAGLEBY, supra note 3, at 27-30. 
48. See Lynn A. Baker, Direct Democracy and Discrimination: A Public Clwice Perspective, 
67 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 707, 709 (1991); Barbara S. Gamble, Putting Civil Rights to a Popular 
Vote, 41 AM. J. POL. So. 245, 245 (1997). 
49. See infra notes 59, 62 (discussing why two researchers opted to exclude women from 
their definitions of "minority" for the purposes of analyzing initiative and referenda outcomes). 
50. Derrick A. Bell, Jr., The Referendum: Democracy's Barrier to Racial Equality, 54 WASH. 
L. REv. 1, 1 (1978-79). 
51. ld. at 2. 
52. ld. at 10-11. 
53. ld. at 13-14. 
54. ld. at 12-13. Bell's discussion begins with two Supreme Court decisions involving 
states' attempts to ensure affordable housing for low-income persons, many of whom are also 
persons of color. In James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971), Bell writes, a 5-3 majority upheld 
Article 34 of the California constitution over a challenge brought by poor blacks and Mexican-
Americans. ld. at 2-3. Under Article 34, state public bodies were prohibited from developing 
federally financed low income housing without the prior approval of voters in local referenda. ld. 
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despite our wealth, we lag behind [numerous other] countries ... 
in addressing basic problems of poverty, slum housing, public 
health, and prison reform, because in those countries, "there is no 
parallel to the corrosive and pervasive role played by race in the 
problem of social neglect in the United States." ... Americans 
refuse to support social reforms because they sense such reforms 
would mainly aid undeserving blacks. 55 
139 
In short, Bell's basic premise is that the deeply entrenched racism of 
white voters will operate to transform popular referenda-regardless of the 
policy issues those referenda address (for example, housing, public health, 
and local taxation)-into vehicles for maintaining racial inequality. 
Bell's concern about the destructive potential of direct democracy 
finds support in two studies analyzing the effect of initiatives and referenda 
on minorities over time. 56 The fJIst of these studies, conducted by Professor 
Barbara Gamble, establishes that majorities routinely utilize direct democ-
racy to decide issues of minority rights, and that anti-minority initiatives are 
extraordinarily successful at the ballot box.57 Specifically, Gamble analyzed 
state and local ballot propositions focused on minority rights from 1959 
through 1993, and concluded that minority interests were defeated 78 per-
cent of the time.58 She found that across five policy areas, including minor-
ity housing, school desegregation, gay rights, English-language use, and 
at 3. Because Article 34 did not rely on "distinctions based on race," Bell suggests, the majority 
refused to subject it to even a "token" (rational basis) Equal Protection review, notwithstanding 
the de facto hardship Article 34 created for minorities.ld. at 3-5. "As long as the disadvantage to 
minorities [from mandatory referenda] is not intentionally racial and arguably furthers a reasona-
ble interest," Bell concludes, "judicial intervention is not forthcoming." Id. at 5. 
In City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 426 U.S. 668 (1976), the Court upheld a 
provision in the charter of suburb Eastlake, Ohio, which conditioned all zoning changes on a "yes" 
vote from 55 percent of local referendum voters. Bell, supra note 50, at 6. The Ohio Supreme 
Court had determined that the mandatory referendum provision "frustrated a multi-family, high 
rise apartment project, in violation of the owner-developer's due process rights." Id. Reflecting on 
the implication of Valtierra and City of East Lake for minorities, Bell opines that in these cases, 
"the seemingly neutral, proper encouragement of direct community control implemented through 
a popular referendum established direct democracy as a constitutionally sanctioned vehicle for 
excluding the poor and, therefore, minorities." Bell, supra note 50, at 7 (emphasis added). 
55. Id. at 12-13 (quoting economist Robert Heilbroner, The Roots of Social Neglect in the 
United States, in Is LAW DEAD? 288, 296 (E. Rostow ed., 1971». Many commentators link seem-
ingly race-neutral, tax-related initiatives such as California's Proposition 13 to white, middle-class 
hostility toward economic and social justice for poor persons and minorities. See, e.g., Julian N. 
Eule, Crocodiles in the Bathtub: State Courts, Voter Initiatives and the Threat oj Electoral Repri-
sal, 65 U. COLO. L. REv. 733, 733 (1994) (noting that these populations were disproportionately 
hurt by Proposition 13). 
56. Gamble, supra note 48; Lazos Vargas, supra note 35. 
57. Gamble, supra note 48, at 261. 
58. Id. at 254; but see Todd Donovan & Shaun Bowler, Direct Democracy and Minority 
Rights: An Extension, 42 AM. J. PoL. SCI. 1020, 1020 (1998) (critiquing Gamble's analysis be-
cause it fails to account for "the scale over which [direct] democracy is practiced," and arguing 
that statewide elections are more likely than local ones to produce "pro-gay policy outcomes"). 
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AIDS,59 voters repealed civil rights laws that were already in effect, passed 
laws that prohibited legislatures from protecting minorities, and overruled 
legislators who sought to expand civil rights guarantees.6O Gamble's find-
ings are consistent with an analysis Professor Sylvia Lazos Vargas con-
ducted of initiatives and referenda from 1960 through 1998.61 Drawing 
from a comprehensive review of nationwide ballot propositions on the 
rights of raciaVethnic and culturaVlanguage minorities, gay men and lesbi-
ans, and illegal immigrants,62 Lazos Vargas concluded that more than 80 
percent of the time, direct democracy "decreased the content of, or staved 
off advances in, minority rights. "63 
These data raise two questions central to the arguments of Bell and 
others: does direct democracy infringe minority rights to any greater extent 
than representative democracy does, and if so, why?64 After all, as Thomas 
Cronin writes in response to this question, "the record of representative 
government is an imperfect one."65 Notwithstanding the lack of empirical 
data on the relative performance of these two systems,66 two realities about 
the political process compel the conclusion that state legislatures protect 
minority rights more reliably than citizen lawmakers. 
59. Gamble, supra note 48, at 246. Gamble analyzed ballot items affecting the rights of 
"racial, ethnic, and language minorities, gay men and lesbians, and people with AIDS." Id. at 252. 
Her study excluded initiatives and referenda deciding questions of women's rights, because wo-
men form an electoral majority and their advocates "have a marked advantage" relative to other 
groups in relation to generating favorable outcomes through direct democracy. Id. at 252-53. The 
exclusion of women's rights issues from her study, Gamble notes, is significant because commen-
tators on direct democracy who are skeptical that direct democracy facilitates a "tyranny of the 
majority" generally "bolster their case by pointing to [the fate of] women's rights issues" at the 
ballot box. Id. at 253. Accord Lazos Vargas, supra note 35, at 422. 
60. Gamble, supra note 48, at 254. 
61. Lazos Vargas, supra note 35, at 422-23. 
62. Lazos Vargas excluded ballot items concerning women's rights issues because even 
though they fit her definition of a minority group, "women appear to be a special case," in part 
because they comprise more than 50 percent of the population. Id. at 404 n. 14. 
63. Id. at 424-25. 
64. Professor Clayton Gillette and others are skeptical that initiatives are more likely to pro-
duce anti-minority outcomes than are laws enacted by legislatures. Clayton P. Gillette, Is Direct 
Democracy Anti-Democratic?, 34 WILLAMETIE L. REv. 609, 621-22 (1998). 
65. CRONIN, supra note 18, at 91-92 (discussing, inter alia, the internment of Americans of 
Japanese heritage in the 1940s); see also Julian N. Eule, Representative Government: The Peo-
ple's Choice, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 777,787 (1991) ("Legislators can be bigots too."); Hans A. 
Linde, When Initiative Lawmaking is Not "Republican Government": The Campaign against Ho-
mosexuality, 72 OR. L. REV. 19,35 n. 69 (1993) (discussing the role of "passions" in motivating 
state legislatures' actions). 
66. Eule, supra note 32, at 1551-52 (noting that "reliable empirical studies [comparing the 
performance of direct democracy and representative democracy] do not exist"). Comparative data 
would be impracticable, if not impossible, to generate. The number of legislative acts researchers 
would have to consider is but one of many barriers. For example, ballots across the nation in-
cluded a record-setting 102 statewide measures in 1996; in the same year, the legislatures of the 
twenty-four direct democracy states enacted more than 17,000 laws out of an unspecified number 
of bills considered. Waters, supra note 28, at 1-2. 
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First, when a legislator casts her vote on a bill addressing any subject, 
she is accountable to a constituency.67 A citizen lawmaker, in contrast, is 
accountable only to himself. Unlike the legislator, he need not worry over 
angry phone calls or e-mail messages awaiting his return from the ballot 
box.68 He need not reflect on his express or implied promise to represent as 
many of his constituents as he can, as well as he can. And from a purely 
pragmatic standpoint, he need not worry about securing minority constitu-
ents' votes if and when he seeks reelection. Some legislators' districts are 
more demographically and ideologically diverse than others', but all repre-
sentatives are accountable to a portion of constituents who oppose the ma-
jority's position on any given issue. As Professor Bell observes, 
Throughout this country's history, politicians have succumbed to 
the temptation to ... appeal[ ] to the desire of whites to dominate 
blacks. More recently, however, the growing black vote has be-
gun to have an impact and even effected "Road to Damascus" 
conversions on more than a few political Pauls, some of whom 
even claim "born again" experiences during mid-term. This im-
pact may be subverted if voting majorities may enact controver-
sial legislation directly.69 
Second, compromise, coalition-building, and logrolling (that is, vote-
trading) inhere in the legislative process.70 Accordingly, there are powerful 
incentives for a legislator to avoid alienating colleagues whose support she 
may later require. By withholding support from a measure that the majority 
of her peers consider too divisive or extreme, she protects her ability to gain 
others' votes on bills more important to her constituents. While some may 
speculate that this check on extreme positions is waning as legislatures be-
come increasingly polarized, it is unquestionably the case that an individual 
voter has no incentive-even in theory-to moderate his actions at the bal-
lot box in order to preserve maneuvering room for later pieces of 
legislation. 
This comment accepts the validity of the foregoing arguments,71 but its 
central concerns do not rely on the conclusion that plebiscites are more 
67. Marei A. Hamilton, The People: The Least Accountable Branch, 4 U. CHI. L. SCH. 
ROUNDTABLE 1,6-7 (1997) (discussing the fact that representatives, unlike individual voters, are 
accountable to the "conunon good"); Lane, supra note 33, at 594 (stating that representatives, not 
voters, must consider a variety of factors, including their constituents' views). 
68. In a 1983 poll of nearly 10,000 registered California voters, eighty-six percent agreed 
with the statement, "Initiative and referendum would allow the public to decide issues where the 
public officials are hesitant to act for fear of offending certain groups." Thomas E. Cronin, Public 
Opinion and Direct Democracy, 21 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 612, 614 (1988) (citation omitted). 
69. Bell, supra note 50, at 13 (citations omitted). 
70. On the relationship between protecting minority rights and the political realities of log-
rolling and coalition-building, see Lane, supra note 33, at 591-92. 
71. The arguments are subject to spirited debate, as are all arguments from theory. Professor 
Lynn Baker has argued from public choice theory that rational, self-interested racial minorities 
will not necessarily prefer representative over direct lawmaking processes. Baker, supra note 48, 
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likely than legislatures to infringe minority rights when given the chance. 
The point is that as direct democracy expands, citizen lawmakers are in-
creasingly in a position to determine the scope of minority rights-and 
more often than not, these rights are curtailed when subject to a popular 
vote. 
C. The Critical Role of the Courts 
The judiciary is the only functioning check on majority power in the 
context of direct democracy. While most direct democracy proponents ac-
cept a counter-majoritarian role for the courts, at least to a degree,n a few 
decry the very notion that a check is needed. What could be more elitist-
more un-American, even-than the idea that "the People" must be pro-
tected from the exercise of their own will? This line of thinking is problem-
atic because it assumes that plebiscitary outcomes actually reflect majority 
will. Moreover, even if initiatives and referenda were accurate gauges of the 
majority's policy preferences, such preferences are not ipso facto constitu-
tional.73 Our founders were acutely aware of the threat unchecked majori-
ties pose to unpopular groups and viewpoints, and they created a judiciary 
strong enough to overcome that threat. The involvement of the courts in 
safeguarding the Constitution from citizen lawmakers' overreaching is not 
only necessary, but proper. 
In the twenty-six direct democracy states, courts are minorities' last 
and only protection against unconstitutional initiatives for reasons both 
structural and political. Structurally, legislators in ten of these states-in-
cluding three of the five with greatest initiative use-are either absolutely 
prohibited or materially limited from repealing or amending statutory initia-
tives.74 One common limitation prohibits legislators from amending or ap-
pealing an initiative for periods from two to seven years after enactment.75 
From the political standpoint, while legislators in eleven states can amend 
at 710; but see Eule, supra note 65 (refuting Baker's four central conclusions) and HASKELL, 
supra note 3, at III (noting that Baker's arguments have largely been discredited). 
72. In responding to direct democracy critics who are concerned about minority rights, pro-
ponents cite the safety net provided by judicial review. HASKELL, supra note 3, at 112. 
73. See Charlow, supra note 6, at 544-45 (Unlike their elected representatives, citizen 
lawmakers have no "explicit constitutional obligation" to see that their actions comport with the 
Constitution. Moreover, citizen lawmakers have no "particular incentive or ability" to discern 
what the Constitution requires.); see also Citizens Against Rent Control/Coal. for Fair Hous. v. 
City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290,295 (1981) (asserting that "voters may no more violate the Con-
stitution by enacting a ballot measure than a legislative body may do so by enacting legislation") 
(quoted in Eule, supra note 32, at 1505-06). 
74. I and R Almanac, supra note 3, at 27 (California legislators cannot appeal or amend at 
any time; a range of limitations inhibit legislators' ability to do so in Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, 
Michigan, Nevada, North Dakota, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming.). As stated in note 25, the 
five states with the greatest initiative use are Oregon, California, Colorado, North Dakota, and 
Arizona. 
75. I and R Almanac, supra note 3, at 27. 
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or repeal a statutory initiative at any time,76 they are arguably unlikely to do 
SO.77 Minorities cannot depend on these legislators to amend or repeal the 
outcomes of direct democracy; the political costs of doing so would be ruin-
ous. At this moment in America, after all, there can be no epithet more 
damning for a politician than "elitist."78 
Even if one accepts the premise that our laws should be whatever "the 
People" desire at any given moment, one must still ask, does the outcome of 
a statewide plebiscite actually reveal the majority will? For a variety of 
reasons, the answer from many social scientists is a resounding "no."79 
First, fewer than 50 percent of American adults regularly vote,80 and of 
those who do, "voter fatigue" and other factors cause some electors to vote 
only for the candidates on their ballots, not the issue propositions.81 Moreo-
ver, those who vote on propositions do not accurately reflect the electorate 
itself.82 Second, misleading issue campaigns, ambiguous proposition lan-
guage, and the emergence of counterproposals on ballots have contributed 
to widespread voter confusion and miscast votes.83 Third, interest groups 
and wealthy individual activists wield enormous power in shaping what are 
later accepted as the policy preferences of "the majority" because these 
groups-not the voters themselves-select and draft the ballot questions.84 
Finally, proponents of public choice theory posit that as a result of "the 
paradox of voting," a plebiscite will never accurately determine the popular 
will.85 In light of the foregoing problems, two commentators go so far as to 
76. Id. (noting that in these states, legislative repeal or amendment requires just a simple 
majority vote in both houses), 
77. ELLIS, supra note 8, at 126. 
78. See THOMAS FRANK, WHAT'S TIlE MATTER WITH KANSAS: How CONSERVATIVES WON 
THE HEART OF AMERICA 113-37 (Metro. Books 2004). 
79. See e.g. Sherman Clark, A Populist Critique of Direct Democracy, 112 HARv. L. REv. 
434 (1998); Eule, supra note 32, at 1513-22; HASKELL, supra note 3, at 121-46; Vitiello & 
Glendon, supra note 6, at 1285-89. 
80. Eule, supra note 32, at 1514. 
81. Itf. at 1515; CRONIN, supra note 18, at 75-77. 
82. CRONIN, supra note 18, at 77 (citing a survey of Massachusetts voters that showed "peo-
ple with higher incomes, Republicans, liberals, and males were more likely than others to vote on 
ballot propositions"); Eule, supra n. 32, at 1515 (noting that those who vote on ballot propositions 
are, relative to voters in general, "disproportionately well-educated, affluent, and white"). 
83. Eule, supra note 32, at 1517. 
84. ELLIS, supra note 8, at 77-79. 
85. HASKELL, supra note 3, at 13. Haskell summarizes the four central tenets of public choice 
theory as follows: 
1) The paradox of voting concerns the relationship of individual choice to group 
choice. The paradox is that whereas an individual can make a rational, logical, and 
coherent ordering of choices, options, or candidates presented to him or her, it is often 
impossible for a group, even one made up of well-informed and rational individuals, to 
order its choices coherently. 
2) Majorities in electoral party politics are really unstable coalitions of minorities 
that rarely if ever express clear and comprehensive policy instructions. 
3) Different legitimate and widely used methods of voting often produce different 
winners. 
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suggest that independent judges may better reflect a broad consensus on 
divisive social issues than the initiative process does.86 
Setting aside the myriad problems inherent in determining the will of 
"the People," it is important to remember that unfiltered majority rule has 
never been the quest of American democracy.87 Our founders created a sys-
tem with numerous counter-majoritarian elements,88 including a Senate ca-
pable of mitigating the variable and occasionally "unenlightened" 
policymaking of the larger and more directly accountable House of Repre-
sentatives.89 In a prescient passage on the necessity of bicameralism, James 
Madison wrote, "[T]here are particular moments in public affairs when the 
people, stimulated by some irregular passion, or some illicit advantage, or 
misled by the artful misrepresentations of interested men, may call for mea-
sures which they themselves will afterwards be the most ready to lament 
and condemn. "90 
Another counter-majoritarian institution our founders created is an in-
dependent judiciary91 capable of "guard[ing] the Constitution and the rights 
of individuals from the effects of those ill humors . . . which sometimes 
disseminate among the people themselves" and occasionally give rise to 
"serious oppressions of the minor party in the community."92 Admittedly, 
the founders designed the judiciary to check the power of citizens' repre-
sentatives to the federal government; after all, initiatives and referenda 
"were virtually unknown to them."93 But no leap of imagination is required 
to conclude that had the founders envisioned the rise of direct democracy, 
they would have deemed an independent judiciary necessary to safeguard 
the Constitution not only from the people's representatives, but from the 
people themselves.94 
4) Any decision-making process used by a group to decide among three or more 
options may be manipulated by strategic voters. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
86. Vitiello & Glendon, supra note 6, at 1277. 
87. Chadow, supra note 6, at 533-41; ELLIS, supra note 8, at 122-23; Eule. supra note 65, at 
784. 
88. These elements include bicameral legislatures. legislative committees, the presidential 
veto, and the "[s]upennajorities [that] are sprinkled throughout the Constitution." ELLIS, supra 
note 8, at 122; see also Vitiello & Glendon, supra note 6, at 1290. 
89. THE FEDERALIST No. 63, at 390 (James Madison) (Willmoore Kendall & George W. 
Carey eds., 1966). 
90. Id. at 384. 
91. Charlow, supra note 6, at 560-61. 
92. THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton). supra note 89, at 469. 
93. Eule, supra note 32, at 1523 (citation omitted). 
94. See id. 
It is idle ... to speculate how the delegates [to the Constitutional Convention] might 
have responded to a proposal that the Constitution contain provisions for initiatives or 
referenda .... But everything about the tone of the Convention suggests that they would 
have looked upon such a scheme 'with a feeling akin to horror. 
(citation omitted). Of course, as a philosophical and a practical matter, "[i]t is one thing for a court 
to undertake the task of protecting the people from their government and quite another to protect 
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The fact that courts serve as the primary check on citizen lawmaking is 
evident in the ubiquity of lawsuits over initiatives and referenda.95 In the 
1990s, more than half of all initiatives in three of the five most active direct 
democracy states were challenged in state or federal COurt.96 The courts 
struck down 55 percent of the challenged laws in whole or in part,97 most 
often because they violated individual rights protected by the U.S. and/or 
state constitutions.9s The abrogated rights included those of free speech, 
freedom from cruel and unusual punishment, equal protection, and procedu-
ral and substantive due process. 99 
m. JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE ENDANGERED 
The expansion of citizen lawmaking generally and its use to decide 
minority rights questions in particular further threaten the precarious posi-
tion American courts have occupied since the Supreme Court decided Mar-
bury v. Madison. tOO To the delight of some and the dismay of others, it is a 
the people from themselves." Id. at 1585. One of the most widely debated questions vis-a-vis 
judicial review of direct democracy is the appropriate standard of review courts should apply. 
Whether the proper standard is stricter than, equal to, or more deferential than that applied to 
legislative enactments is beyond the scope of this comment. 
95. See Kenneth P. Miller, The Role of Courts in the Initiative Process: A Search for Stan-
dartls I, II (Am. Pol. Sci. Ass'n, Sep. 1999), available at http://www.iandrinstitute.orglStudies. 
htrn (arguing that courts have "become the meta-check on the initiative process" and describing 
the 1990s as "the Golden Age of initiative litigation"); see also Craig B. Holman & Robert Stem, 
Judicial Review of Ballot Initiatives: The Changing Role of State and Federal Courts, 31 Loy. 
L.A. L. REv. 1239, 1256--58 (1998) ("Federal litigation is ... fast becoming another step in an 
opposition campaign strategy. If opponents fail to defeat an initiative at the ballot box, a portion of 
the campaign budget is routinely set aside to contest the initiative in federal court."); John Jacobs, 
Poll: Voters Like Initiative Process, But Want It Fixed, SACRAMENTO BEE, Dec. 9, 1997, at B7 
(quoting University of California Berkeley Political Scientist Gene Lee's characterization of the 
overloaded judiciary as an "extraordinary cost" of the initiative explosion). 
96. Miller, supra note 95, at 2 (analyzing litigation over initiatives in California, Oregon, and 
Colorado). State courts adjudicated roughly two times more initiative challenges than federal 
courts did, but the latter were "somewhat more likely" to invalidate the challenged law. Id. at 3. 
The prevailing explanation for why federal courts are more likely to strike down initiatives stems 
from the relative security and therefore independence offederaljudges (who have lifetime tenure) 
compared to their elected state counterparts. Id. at 13 (citing Gerald F. Uelman, Crocodiles in the 
Bathtub: Maintaining the Independence of State Supreme Courts in an Era of Judicial Politiciza-
tion, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1133 (1977) and Vitiello & Glendon, supra note 6); see Holman & 
Stem, supra note 95, at 1240-41; but see Richard L. Hasen, Judging the Judges of Initiatives: A 
Comment on Holman and Stem, 31 Loy. LA L. REv. 1267, 1267-70 (1998) (questioning the 
empirical basis for the conclusion that federal judges are less deferential to initiatives than are 
California state judges). 
97. Miller, supra note 95, at 2. 
98. Id. at 3. 
99. Id. at 22. Undoubtedly some of the violations of "individual rights" included in Miller's 
analysis are not violations of "minority" rights per se. Notwithstanding the distinction, the fact 
remains that in an era when social policy is increasingly shaped by direct democracy, the courts 
"stand virtually alone" in countering majoritarian excess. Id. at 29. Attempts to curtail the courts' 
checking power, therefore, endanger unpopular minorities most. 
100. 5 U.S. 137 (1803). Marbury established that among the three branches of government, 
the Supreme Court decides whether legislative acts comply with the Constitution. In cases con-
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posItion that may soon be untenable. The more diligently the judiciary 
meets its obligation to safeguard minorities' constitutionally protected 
rights, the more vulnerable it is to backlash from outraged majorities. The 
backlash in tum threatens judicial independence, 101 thereby undermining 
courts' capacity to check abuses of raw majority power. Rage against the 
courts is evident in incendiary criticism that foments hostility toward "ac-
tivist" judges102 and erodes public confidence in the state and federal judi-
ciaries. It is also evident in the so-called "reforms" that some radical 
activists, officials, and interest groups propose to curtail the power and au-
tonomy of the courts. 
The gathering threat to judicial independence has numerous causes 
apart from the outrage generated by invalidated initiatives. In fact, the 
growing popularity of direct democracy is a product of many of the same 
economic, social, and technological developments that have placed the 
courts at the center of local and national politics.103 But shared origins are 
only one dimension of the relationship between the rise of the initiative and 
the decline of judicial independence. In a 1994 article, Professor Julian Eule 
identified a causal dimension between these two trends, stating: 
[J]udicial protection is most needed in the face of voter measures 
motivated by popular passion or prejudice. Yet it is precisely 
when electorally accountable judges stand up to such efforts that 
ceming constitutionally suspect acts, Chief Justice John Marshall wrote, "It is emphatically the 
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is." [d. at 177. According to 
historian Joel B. Grossman, Marbury is "the poster child of the American legal system." Martha 
Neil, Cases and Controversies: Some Decisions Are All the Rage-Literally, ABAJournal.com, 
http://www.abanet.orgljournaVredesignllOfmad.html (Sep. 29, 2(05) (last visited Jan. 27, 2(07). 
101. For the purposes of this comment, "judicial independence" denotes decisional and insti-
tutional independence as elucidated in the following definition from the American Judicature So-
ciety (AJS): 
Judicial independence is a concept that expresses the ideal state of the judicial branch of 
government. The concept encompasses the idea that individual judges and the judicial 
branch as a whole should work free of ideological influence. Scholars have broken 
down the general idea of judicial independence into two distinct concepts: decisional 
independence and institutional, or branch, independence. Decisional independence re-
fers to a judge's ability to render decisions free from political or popular influence based 
solely on the individual facts and applicable law. Institutional independence describes 
the separation of the judicial branch from the executive and legislative branches of 
government. 
AJS, What is Judicial Indepedence?, http://www.ajs.orglcji/cjLwhatisji.asp (last visited Jan. 27, 
2(07). 
102. Though the phrase ')udicial activist" has lately been associated primarily with critics 
from the political right, when either Republicans or Democrats "seek to criticize judges or judicial 
nominees, they often resort to the same language ... the word 'activist' is rarely defined. Often it 
simply means that the judge makes decisions with which the critic disagrees." Paul Gewirtz & 
Chad Golder, Editorial, So Who Are the Activists?, N.Y. TIMES, Jui. 6, 2005, at A19. 
103. These developments include, inter alia, the "tabloidization" of American media and the 
ascension of the "sound bite" as a replacement for thoughtful analysis and reporting of complex 
issues, the increasingly partisan nature of the political sphere, and an increasingly active and well 
funded cadre of special interest groups and single-issue activists. Uelman, supra note 96, at 
1134-35. 
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they are most at risk. A judiciary that is directly accountable to 
the identical forces which shaped the judgment under review may 
find it difficult to provide sustained enforcement of more deliber-
ative constitutional norms. 104 
147 
In the eleven years since Professor EuIe's article, it has become abun-
dantly clear that both electorally accountable state judges and life-tenured 
federal judges are vulnerable to an increasingly destructive backlash from 
organized interests that see the courts as an impediment to their policy 
agendas. 
A. The Targeting of Individual Judges 
To varying degrees, judges in both the federal and state judiciaries are 
vulnerable to political pressures. Federal judges are appointed by the presi-
dent with "advice and consent" from the Senate and enjoy lifetime tenure 
"during good behaviour,"lo5 while judges in thirty-nine states are in some 
way accountable to the electorate. 106 Elected judges face well-funded and 
increasingly successful campaigns to prevent their reelection, often on the 
basis of one unpopular opinion.107 But appointed judges-both federal and 
state-are also under siege from impeachment campaigns and other forms 
of reprisal.108 Although calls for impeachment have met with relatively lit-
tle success,l09 they have chilling effects of their own. Regardless of what 
form they take, attacks on individual judges influence judicial decisionmak-
104. Eule, supra note 55, at 739; see also Miller, supra note 16, at 1055 (discussing voter 
frustration with courts that overturn initiatives and stating that "the same Populist impulse that 
drives initiative lawmaking can further politicize the judiciary and threaten its independence"). 
105. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.; U.S. CONST. art. ill, § L As previously discussed, the 
Framers viewed lifetime tenure as a way to insulate the federal judiciary from encroachment by 
the other braches of government and to thwart "mob rule." Vitiello & Glendon, supra note 6, at 
1290. 
106. Rachel Paine Caufield, The Foreboding National Trends in Judicial Elections, Presenta-
tion to the Iowa Judges Conference 1 (June 24, 2005), available at http://www.ajs.orglselectionl 
docslcaufield_iajudges30nference.pdf (last visited Apr. 27, 2006). Among the thirty-nine states 
are those with partisan elections, nonpartisan elections, and "hybrid" systems. ld. Judges Sitting on 
the highest courts of all but two direct initiative states (Maine and Massachusetts) are ultimately 
accountable to voters. Eule, supra note 55, at 735. 
107. Caufield, supra note 106, at 4; George Hodak ed., Judges in the Culture Wars Crossfire, 
A.B.A. J., Oct 5, 2005, http://www.abanet.orgljournallredesigniIOfround.html (last visited Feb. 
10,2006). 
108. Death threats and acts of physical violence against American judges are also on the rise. 
Julian Borger, Former Top Judge says U.S. Risks Edging Near to Dictatorship, TIm GUARDIAN 
(London), Mar. 13, 2006, at 19 (reporting on a speech by former Supreme Court Justice Sandra 
Day O'Connor, in which the latter "noted [that] death threats against judges were on the rise"); 
Judge Damon Keith, Editorial, Court Critics Out of Order? Yes: Recent Attacks on Independence 
of Judges Endanger Democracy, DETROIT FREE PREss. Apr. 16,2006, at IE (describing specific 
threats made against Supreme Court justices Ruth Bader Ginsberg and Sandra Day O·Connor). 
109. Impeachment of federal judges by the House of Representatives has taken place only 
thirteen times since 1789. Butch Mabin, Ginsburg speaks at UNL, LINCOLN STAR J. (Lincoln, 
Neb.), Apr. 8, 2006, available at http://journalstar.comJarticles/2006/04107Ilocalld0c4436adb57e 
62e783323426.txt (citing Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg). 
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ing by increasing the personal and professional risks for judges who inter-
pret the law in ways at odds with the majority's preferences. Such attacks 
also erode public confidence in the judiciary itself. 
Attacks on numerous judges over the past twenty years illuminate the 
increasing politicization of the judiciary and its implications for judicial 
independence. For example, retention elections for California Supreme 
Court justices passed without much attention until the mid-l 980s. 110 Then 
in 1986, Chief Justice Rose Bird and Associate Justices Joseph Grodin and 
Cruz Reynoso lost their seats in the wake of what many insiders considered 
a purely political campaign.lll Especially rankled by the justices' rulings in 
death penalty cases, 1 12 conservative activists spent more than seven million 
dollars to oust them1l3 by funding campaign ads equating "no votes" 
against the justices with "yes votes" for the death penalty.u4 Voters de-
feated Bird by a two-to-one margin, apparently convinced by conservatives' 
portrayal of her as a "left-wing zealot who arrogantly refused to implement 
laws the people wanted."IlS 
Similarly, in 1990, Mississippi voters ousted Supreme Court Justice 
Joel Blass in favor of an opponent who portrayed him as "soft on crime." 1 16 
Un surprisingly, the winning candidate-a self-described "tough judge for 
tough times" -had secured the endorsement of the Mississippi Prosecutors 
Association. ll7 Also that year, anti-abortion interest groups in Florida at-
tempted to oust then Chief Justice Leander Shaw, Jr.IIs Their effort was 
unsuccessful, but it required Shaw to raise and spend $300,000 to retain his 
seat. 1I9 The same forces organized in 1992 against Florida Supreme Court 
Associate Justice Rosemary Barkett, this time joined by prosecutors and 
police who decried a single dissenting opinion from Barkett in a death pen-
alty case. 120 Barkett held on to her seat after receiving nearly 61 percent of 
the vote, but the single death penalty decision cost her an appointment to 
the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. l2l Also in 1992, pro-death 
110. Maura Dolan, Rose Bird's Questfor Obscurity; Voted out in 1986 after a Firestorm of 
Controversy, the Former Chief Justice of California is Ponrayed by Some as a Struggling Re-
cluse, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 15, 1995, at AI. 
111. Anthony Murray, Editorial, Once is Enough, Don't Settle Judicial Scores, L.A. TIMES, 
Mar. 24, 1987, at Metro 5. 
112. Uelman, supra note 96, at 1136. 
1l3. Murray, supra note 111. 
114. Uelman. supra note 96, at 1136. 
115. Dolan, supra note 110. 
116. Uelman, supra note 96, at 1137. 
117. 1d. 
118. 1d. at 1140 (footnote omitted). 
119. [d. 
120. [d. The police and prosecutors were apparently unmoved by Barkett's overall record in 
death penalty cases; in her previous nine years on the bench, she had voted to affirm more than 
two hundred death sentences. [d. 
121. Id. 
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penalty interests succeeded in removing Mississippi Supreme Court Associ-
ate Justice James Robertson on the basis of two dissenting opinions.122 
Four years later, activists orchestrated the defeat of Tennessee Su-
preme Court Justice Penny White-the first judge ever removed by voters 
in the state's twenty-two year history of retention elections for appellate 
courtS. 123 After taking advantage of free media coverage to position the 
contest as "a referendum on the death penalty," conservatives celebrated 
White's defeat, deeming it "the first blow in their battle 'to take back the 
courts.' ,,124 The hostility against White stemmed from a single death pen-
alty decision. 125 Nebraska Supreme Court Justice David Lanphier also fell 
prey to voter backlash in 1996, his defeat attributable to the same well-
financed interests that sponsored the successful term limits initiative he 
voted to overturn. 126 
More recently, Nevada Supreme Court Justice Deborah Agosti sur-
vived a recall campaign that anti-tax activists mounted in 2003, only to 
decide not to participate in a subsequent retention election. 127 The recall 
campaign stemmed from a single Supreme Court decision holding that the 
legislature was required to fund public education, notwithstanding a consti-
tutional provision requiring a two-thirds majority to pass tax bills. 128 In 
2004, Iowa Senator Kenneth Veenstra urged voters to unseat four state su-
preme court justices in retaliation for a single decision in which the justices 
voted to invalidate a law regulating tax rates for different types of 
casinos. 129 
As the foregoing incidents demonstrate, campaigns to oust incumbent 
state judges on the basis of one or two controversial decisions have become 
a regular feature of American political life. The trend toward increasingly 
issue-oriented judicial elections shows no signs of abating and indeed, most 
commentators expect it to accelerate.13o At the same time, incidents of re-
122. Id. at 1137. 
123. Jeff Woods, Public Outrage Nails a Judge, NASHVILLE BANNER (Nasvhille, Tenn.), Aug. 
2, 1996. at AI. 
124. Id. Commenting on White's removal, Tennessee Conservative Union President John Da-
vies said, "'This is a historic decision where the people have started to take back the courts from 
soft-on-crime judges.· .. Id. 
125. Id.; Gerald F. Uelman, Judges Hear the Crocodiles Snapping; Justice: Nationwide, the 
Trend is to Stifle Correct but Politically Unpopular Rulings, L. A. TIMEs, Feb. 19, 1997, at Metro 
B9. 
126. Id. 
127. Am. Judicature Soc'y, Judges under Fire, http://www.ajs.org/cjiicjUlre.asp (last visited 
Feb. 10. 2(06) (citations omitted). 
128. Id. 
129. Id. 
130. In the wake of Republican Party of Minn. v. White. 536 U.S. 765, 765 (2002) (holding 
that candidates for judicial office have a First Amendment right to announce their views on dis-
puted legal and political issues). many commentators have asserted that judicial elections will 
become increasingly partisan. bitter, and expensive. See, e.g., Caufield, supra note 106, at 4 
(noting that "more money and more organized interests equal more politically motivated attacks 
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prisal against state judges who are not subject to elections13l and even life-
tenured federal judges have also become quite unremarkable.132 
The targeting of judges based on single issues clearly undermines deci-
sional independence within the judiciary. As former California Supreme 
Court Justice Otto Kaus explained, a judge is acutely aware of the possible 
consequences of his decision in a controversial case.133 This awareness, 
Kaus writes, is akin to "finding a crocodile in [the] bathtub when you go in 
to shave in the morning. You know it's there, and you try not to think about 
it, but it's hard to think about much else while you're shaving."134 Kaus's 
view comports with survey results from 1991-a time when the judiciary 
was arguably less politicized than it is today-showing that just over 60 
percent of 369 electorally accountable judges then believed that retention 
elections affect judicial behavior.135 Approximately 28 percent of the re-
spondents felt that elections made them "more sensitive to public opinion," 
on judges and judicial candidates," and that White will "further exacerbat[e] ... these trends"); 
Hon. Joseph M. Hood, Judicial Independence, 23 NAT'L ASS'N ADMIN. L. JUDGES J. 137, 
139-40 (2003) (discussing the implications of the White decision for judicial independence vis-a-
vis the role of "money and special interest groups"). 
Even before White was decided, the spectacular amount of money pouring into judicial elec-
tions nationwide both caused and reflected an increasingly politicized judiciary. Caufield, supra 
note 106, at 5. Spending on elections for state supreme court justices, for example, reached a new 
record in 2004, with $9.3 million spent to fill a single seat on the Illinois Supreme Court. Tim 
Jones, Voters, Activists Put Heat on Judges; Interest Groups, Playing to Voter Resentment, Mount 
TV Attack Ads, CHI. TRIBUNE, Dec. 5, 2005, at 1. Much of the money is spent on deceptive ads 
that oversimplify judges' records. Id. In an archetypical example, one TV spot vilified a (soon-to-
be-defeated) justice in West Virginia as "too dangerous for our kids." Id. The total tab for televi-
sion advertising promoting and disparaging judicial candidates in fifteen states reached $21 mil-
lion in 2004. Caufield, supra note 106, at 3. 
131. Examples include a Massachusetts judge who was targeted by a state representative for 
removal in 2()(x), based on a single instance of unacceptably "lenient" sentencing involving a 
convicted child molester. Editorial, Lopez Not Issue, Independence Is, BOSTON HERALD, Apr. 13, 
2001, at 24. A Massachusetts state representative proposed removing all four justices who com-
prised the majority in Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 941 (Mass. 2003), 
which legalized same-sex marriage in the state. Am. Judicature Soc'y, supra note 127. Chief 
Justice Margaret Marshall was specifically targeted for removal by the Article 8 Alliance, an anti-
gay marriage group. Id. In 2004, a Colorado state representative, backed by the Christian advo-
cacy group Focus on the Family, introduced a resolution to impeach a Denver district judge for 
allegedly violating the constitutional rights of a mother in a custody battle with her former lesbian 
partner. Chris Frates, GOP Criticizes Group's Push to Impeach Judge, DENVER POST, Apr. 18, 
2004, at B2. The mother had "embraced Christianity and renounced homosexuality," prompting 
the judge to order her not to expose the child to religious doctrines or other teaching of a 
homophobic nature. Id. 
132. The American Judicature Society has documented fourteen incidents of reprisal, includ-
ing calls for impeachment, against federal judges at all levels since 2001. Am. Judicature Soc'y, 
supra note 127. 
133. Uelman, supra note 96, at 1133. 
134. Id. (footnote omitted). Kaus himself confessed that when he voted to uphold the constitu-
tionality of a ballot initiative in 1982, his position might have been subconsciously influenced by 
thoughts of his upcoming retention election. Eule, supra note 55, at 738 (footnote omitted). 
135. Larry T. Aspin & William K. Hall, Retention Elections and Judicial Behavior, 77 JUDI-
CATURE 306, 312 (1994). 
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and approximately 15 percent thought that "judges avoid[ed] controversial 
cases or rulings before elections."136 While the survey's designers did not 
speculate about the role of respondent bias in their survey, it is logical to 
assume that some underreporting occurred, given that judges would likely 
prefer to believe that their decisional independence is unaffected by politi-
cal pressure. 
Professor Gerald Uelman tested Kaus's "crocodile theory" by analyz-
ing the actual effect of single-issue attacks against elected judges, and the 
results are sobering. Describing the well documented backlash over anti-
death penalty rulings as "the fattest crocodile," Uelman concluded that po-
litical pressure is partly responsible for a remarkable and relatively recent 
increase in the number of death sentences affirmed by six state supreme 
courtS.137 In 1985, these six courts affirmed 63 percent of death sentences 
appealed.138 By 1995, that rate had jumped to 90 percent. 139 According to 
Uelman's analysis, the rate at which judges affIrm death sentences appears 
to correlate with methods of judicial selection: the less secure a judge's 
position, the more likely she is to affIrm. 140 
In addition to creating a climate in which judges' decisionmaking is 
increasingly subject to political influence, the targeting of individual 
judges-and the corresponding portrayal of them as activists in black 
robes-has contributed to a troubling lack of public confIdence in the judi-
ciary.141 More than six years ago, a study sponsored by the National Center 
for State Courts found that 81 percent of people surveyed believed politics 
influences judicial decisions.142 A 2005 poll by the ABA Journal revealed 
equally concerning results. Among its fIndings: 56 percent of respondents 
strongly agreed or somewhat agreed with the statement, "Judicial activism 
... seems to have reached a crisis. Judges routinely overrule the will of the 
people, invent new rights and ignore traditional morality."143 
136. Id. at 312-13. 
137. Uelman, supra note 96, at 1136 (analyzing affirmance rates in California, Illinois, Indi-
ana, Ohio, Texas, and Virginia). 
138. Id. 
139. Id. 
140. Id. at 1137 (For example, judges subjected to partisan contested elections affIrm at a rate 
of 62.5 percent; judges appointed by executives without retention elections affirm only 26.3 per-
cent of the sentences.). 
141. See Editorial, Injudicious Intimidation: Objections over Courts Cross Line from Healthy 
Criticism to Dangerous Threat, DETROIT FREE PREss, Apr. 16, 2006, at 2 (asserting that while 
"speaking out" on judicial decisions" is good for democracy, "venom[ous]" remarks "can erode 
public faith in justice"). 
142. Lauren Stiller Rildeen, Courting Change. Independently Watchful Eyes Still See Us as 
World Model, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. IS, 2000, at C3. 
143. Martha Neil, Half of U.S. Sees 'Judicial Activism Crisis', Sept. 30, 2005, http://www.aba 
net.org/journaUredesignls30survey.html. 
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B. Attacks on the Judicial Branch 
The low level of confidence the judiciary enjoys among members of 
the public undoubtedly enables numerous anti-court "reforms" to advance 
further than they otherwise would. Indeed, proposals that would have 
seemed unnecessary and even radical in bygone eras are now quite com-
mon. Many of them seek to undermine the structural integrity of federal and 
state judiciaries in profound ways, revealing a deep contempt not only for 
unpopular decisions, but for the very principle of judicial independence. 144 
Contempt for the institution of the judiciary and widespread ignorance 
of its counter-majoritarian role145 are manifest in the remarks of political 
actors nationwide. Former U.S. Representative Tom Delay once opined that 
"an impeachable offense is whatever a majority of the House of Representa-
tives considers it to be at a given moment in history,"146 and at the zenith of 
the Terri Schiavo controversy, he railed against "the 'arrogant, out-of-con-
trol, unaccountable' judiciary."147 More dramatically, evangelist Pat Rob-
ertson characterized the federal judiciary as more threatening to America 
than were Nazi Germany, Japan, and the Civil War,148 and a Focus on the 
Family spokesperson described "judicial tyranny" as "one of the biggest 
threats to our civil and religious liberties."149 State legislators have also 
joined in the verbal assault. For example, Alaska senator Loren Leman re-
marked that "The [Alaska Supreme Court] needs to be a reflection of Alas-
kan society and our values ... [a]nd if it isn't, then we need to get hold of 
144. On the important distinction between criticizing specific decisions and disparaging the 
judiciary as a whole, see Hodak:. supra note 107, at 3 (quoting Professor Michael Tigar's concerns 
over "attacks by rnajoritarian institutions on the right of judges to make [countermajoritarian] 
decisions"); Herman Schwartz, Editorial, The Nation; The Law; The War against Judiciallnde-
pendence, L.A. TIMES, May II, 1997, at M2 (distinguishing "justified and indeed necessary" 
criticism of courts' performances from "[p]artisan attacks that undermine their independence"). 
145. See Neil, supra note 143 (referencing Professor Charles G. Geyh's observation that 
[t]he idea that judges should 'somehow follow the voters' views ... reflects a funda-
mental misunderstanding of what judges are supposed to do'" and describing ABA 
President Michael S. Greco's appointment of a nonpartisan Commission on Civic Edu-
cation and the Separation of Powers to "educate Americans about the role of an inde-
pendent judiciary in U.S. government. 
146. Schwartz, supra note 144 (quoting Rep. DeLay). DeLay was one of seventy-four co-
sponsors of the Reaffirmation of American Independence Resolution, H.R. Res. 568, lO8th Congo 
(2004). The resolution "express[ed] the sense of the House of Representatives" that federal courts 
should cease using foreign legal sources to interpret U.S. law. Representative Tom Feeney, spon-
sor of the Resolution, threatened that "judges who based decisions on foreign precedents would 
risk the 'ultimate remedy' of impeachment." Linda Greenhouse, Rehnquist Resumes His Call for 
Judicial Independence, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1,2005, at AlO. Commenting on Representative Fee-
ney's remarks, Chief Justice William Rehnquist asserted that "it ha[s] been clear since early in the 
country's history that 'a judge's judicial acts may not serve as a basis for impeachment.'" [d. 
147. Jones, supra note 130 (quoting Rep. DeLay). 
148. Derek Rose, Robertson: Judges Worse Than Al Qaeda, N.Y. DAlLY NEWS, May 2, 2005, 
at lO. 
149. Frates, supra note 131 (quoting Peter Brandt), 
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it."lS0 And Florida representative Victor Crist identified "judges who do not 
listen to the will of the people" as a problem the Florida legislature must 
address. lSI 
While the foregoing remarks illuminate the intensity of the backlash 
against the American judiciary, the "remedies" some have proposed are bet-
ter indicators of its potential implications.1s2 In the U.S. Congress, bills 
introduced since 1997 would subject federal judges to Senate reconfirma-
tion after 10 years;lS3 limit federal judges' power to overturn state initia-
tives;lS4 prohibit federal courts from relying on foreign or international law 
in interpreting the U.S. Constitution;lss and strip federal courts' jurisdiction 
over suits challenging the Defense of Marriage Act, lS6 governmental dis-
plays of the Ten Commandments,lS7 and the recitation of the Pledge of 
Allegiance.1s8 Former Federal Judge Robert Bork has advocated for a con-
stitutional amendment that would empower Congress-with only a simple 
150. Liz Ruskin, A Question of Balance: Court Rulings Ignite Conservative Backlash, Debate 
over Judge Selection, ANCHORAGE DAlLY NEWS, Mar. 29, 1998, at Al (quoting Sen. Leman). 
151. Tampa Tribune Editorial Board, Crist's Assault on the High Court, TAMPA TRIB., May 
15, 2000, at 8 (quoting Rep. Crist). 
152. Speaking before a Georgetown University audience in March 2006, former Supreme 
Court Justice Sandra Day O'Connor cited the records of autocracies and former Communist coun-
tries and warned that politically-motivated interference with the American judiciary is placing the 
U.S. "in danger of edging towards dictatorship." Borger, supra note 108. 
153. H.R.J. Res. 77, 105th Congo (1997). 
154. H.R. 1170, 104th Congo (1995); Judicial Reform Act of 1998, H.R. 1252, 105th Congo 
(1997). Both bills would prohibit individual federal judges from enjoining any voter-enacted initi-
ative on grounds of unconstitutionality and would require that any applications for injunction be 
heard by three-judge panels. 
155. Constitution Restoration Act of 2005, H.R. 1070, 109th Congo (1995). Forty-six repre-
sentatives cosponsored this bill. 
156. Marriage Protection Act of 2005, H.R. 1100, 109th Congo (2005). Seventy-five represent-
atives co-sponsored the bill. (The Defense of Marriage Act, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738C (2000), allows 
states to refuse to recognize same-sex marriages granted by other states.) 
157. Safeguarding Our Religious Liberties Act, H.R. 4576, 109th Congo (2005). Seven repre-
sentatives co-sponsored the bill. 
158. Id. In a typical example of the ubiquitous political grandstanding that occurs when un-
popular court decisions are announced, numerous officials rushed to condeInn the Ninth Circuit 
decision that undoubtedly motivated H.R. 4576. President Bush called "ridiculous" the outcome of 
Newdow V. U.S. Congress, 292 F.3d 597 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that a California school district's 
policy of teacher-led recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance including the words "under God" 
violated the Establishment Clause). Andrew Cohen, Editorial, The Dangers of Holding Courts in 
Contempt, THE WASHINGTON POST, July 7, 2002, at B2. Senator Tom Daschle deemed the deci-
sion '1ust nuts," while Senator Robert Byrd described the authoring judges as "stupid" and Repre-
sentative Joseph Pitts presciently opined that "it was time 'for Congress and the president to stand 
up to the courts that have arrogated so much power to themselves.''' Id. 
It must be noted that Congress has threatened to strip the courts' jurisdiction in the past, as in 
the 1950s when outrage over desegregation was mounting. Mabin, supra note 109; see also Vi-
tiello & Glendon, supra note 6, at 1294 (noting that in 1981 and 1982, members of Congress 
introduced thirty bills attempting to strip federal courts' jurisdiction over challenges involving 
school prayer, abortion, and busing). The fact that these efforts are nothing new provides little 
comfort when one considers the larger context-social, political, economic, and technologica1-
fueling the current backlash against the judiciary. See supra note 103 and accompanying text. 
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majority in both houses-to overrule the decisions of federal and state 
judges.159 In Florida, where the backlash against the state judiciary seems 
especially virulent, state legislators have entertained a bill that would re-
quire incumbent appellate judges to win two-thirds majorities in retention 
elections and restrict judicial oversight of lawyers' conduct to that which 
occurs in court. 160 Florida politicians have also advocated a constitutional 
amendment to remove death penalty cases from the state supreme court's 
jurisdiction and make such cases the exclusive province of an autonomous 
"death court," whose every member would be appointed by the governor. 161 
Interest groups nationwide are gaining attention with their own anti-
judiciary proposals. One of the most noteworthy is a proposed amendment 
to South Dakota's constitution that appeared on statewide ballots in No-
vember 2006. Sponsored by a "single-issue grassroots organization," 
J.A.I.L. 4 Judges (the Judicial Accountability Initiative Law) would have 
ensured judicial accountability to "the People in mass" by empowering citi-
zen grand juries to assess whether judges' decisions reflect "lawful conclu-
sions."162 Another ambitious interest group, PeopleNotJudges.com, has 
dedicated itself exclusively to "reining in runaway judges." 163 Among 
other proposals, the group calls on Congress and the states to 
pass a "Judicial Reform Amendment" to the U.S. Constitution 
that would: (a) place a maximum ten year term limit on all federal 
and state judges; and (b) provide that the "good behavior" stan-
dard of Article III, Section I shall be determined by the President 
with the advice and consent of the Senate. 164 
159. Bob Herbert, Editorial, A Plan to Intimidate Judges, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2000, at A29 
(citing ROBERT BORK, SLOUCHING TOWARD GOMMORAH: MODERN LIBERALISM 
AND AMERICAN DECLINE (HarperCollins 1996». Apparently unaware that such a draconian 
change would require a constitutional amendment, Kentucky Representative Ron Lewis tried to 
accomplish the same outcome by sponsoring The Congressional Accountability for Judicial Activ-
ism Act of 2004, H.R. 3920. Dahlia Lithwick, Not-So Supreme: The Dumb New Proposal to Veto 
the Supreme Court, SLATE, Mar. 17, 2004, http://www.slate.comlidl2097306. On the subject of 
judges disparaging their peers and the judiciary generally, see Andrew Cohen, Editorial, The Dan-
gers of Holding Judges in Contempt, WASH. POST, Jul. 7, 2002, at B2. 
160. Editorial, Vandals after Our Judiciary, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES (St. Petersburg, Fla.), 
Mar. 2, 2001, at 14A (citing H.R.J. Res. 627 (2001». 
161. Editorial, Death of High Court Not in State's Interest, PALM BEACH POST (Palm Beach, 
Fla.), Aug. 19,2000, at A14. 
162. J.A.I.L. 4 Judges, J.A.I.L., http://www.jaiI4judges.org (last visited Apr. 2, 2007); Am. 
Judicature Soc'y, Editorial, An Earthquake in South Dakota?, http://www.ajs.org/ajsiajs3ditorial-
template.asp?contenUd=472 (last visited Apr. 26, 2006). Approximately 47,000 South Dakotans 
signed the petition required to qualify J.A.I.L. for the statewide ballot. Jones, supra note 130. 
Thankfully, the amendment was soundly defeated, with approximately 89 percent of voters op-
posed. Rebecca Fater, Marshall: Fight to Protest Courts, The Sun (Lowell, Mass.) Dec. 1, 2006, 
at 1. 
163. PeopleNotJudges.com, The Team, http://www.peoplenotjudges.comlaboutlteam.php (last 
visited Apr. 25, 2006). 
164. PeopleNotJudges.com, The Plan. http://www.peoplenotjudges.comlaboutiplan.php (last 
visited Apr. 25, 2006). 
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Activists at the ideological fringe are taking a multifaceted approach to 
eliminate judicial independence. Aside from the ill~conceived legislative 
"reforms" emerging at the state and federal levels, calls to cut funding for 
the operation of the courts ring out from editorial pages and statehouses 
alike. 165 Another tactic that has actually succeeded in thwarting the work of 
the judiciary is legislative inaction on judicial nominations. 166 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Are the attacks on judges and the judiciary a temporary reflection of 
our anxiety at the beginning of a new century, or a sign that the American 
system of government is changing in profound and permanent ways? In 
contemplating this question, it is instructive to consider (1) the expanding 
use of direct democracy to decide controversial matters of public policy; 
and (2) the particularly virulent emotions courts arouse when they invali-
date voter-approved initiatives. If current trends in the use of the initiative 
and referendum continue-and especially if the federal government or addi-
tional states adopt direct democracy as a vehicle for lawmaking-outraged 
majorities may ultimately succeed in transforming our historically indepen-
dent judiciary into a bureau of "rubber-stampers" who are powerless to pro-
tect minority rights. 
Advocates of judicial "reform" can easily exploit invalidated initia-
tives and referenda to generate support for their cause because judicial re-
view of citizen lawmaking offends many Americans' core beliefs about 
what our democracy is and should be. Notwithstanding the vision of this 
country's founders, the idea that a desirable society is one where minorities 
are protected in spite of majority preferences is counterintuitive and perhaps 
even radical to many citizens. Given our collective belief in majority rule as 
a good unto itself, Americans' growing outrage over judicial review in the 
direct democracy context is not at all surprising.167 Significantly, the out-
165. Robert Bauer, Editorial, A Court Too Supreme for Our Good, WASH. POST, Aug. 7, 2005, 
at B3 (arguing that Congress should cut the Supreme Court's budget until the latter allows cam-
eras in the courtroom); Editorial. Contempt of Courts, BOSTON GLOBE, May 9, 2002, at A18 
(criticizing legislature's $40 million in. budget cuts to the state judiciary in 2001 and proposing 
cuts of $60 million from a $500 million budget in 2002); PeopleNotJudges.com, supra note 164 
(calling on Congress to freeze federal judges' salaries and cut the judicial budget by five percent 
with the exception of salaries); Frank Phillips, Judges Wary of Challenging Beacon Hill, BOSTON 
GLOBE, Dec. 12,2001, at Bl (discussing the legislatures' use of the budget as a tool to infringe 
state courts' autonomy). 
166. Schwartz, supra note 144 (describing "stalling the judicial selection process itself' as 
part of "the strategy for going after the federal bench"). After securing approval from the Senate 
judiciary Committee for a federal judgeship in 1996, one nominee was asked to state her "views 
in support or in opposition to [all 160] California initiatives in the last decade." ld. 
167. Americans' relative ignorance about the three branches of government generally and the 
role our framers envisioned for each one undoubtedly exacerbates the aspect of human nature to 
equate majority rule with ideals such as fairness, justice, etc. In a recent poll sponsored by the 
American Bar Association, 40 percent of those surveyed could not identify the three branches of 
government. Neil. supra note 143. Fifty-six percent strongly agreed or somewhat agreed with the 
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rage stems not from differences of opinion about whether minority rights 
are violated by given ballot propositions, but from deeply-rooted convic-
tions that it is nobler (or at least "fairer") to effectuate the will of the major-
ity than to protect the rights of the minority. 
When coupled with a growing certainty among interest groups and in-
dividuals about the ultimate righteousness of their preferred social policies, 
the belief that majority rule is itself a moral good is deeply troubling. As 
Judge Learned Hand so powerfully stated at a 1944 ceremony in honor of "I 
Am an American Day": 
The spirit of liberty is the spirit which is not too sure that it is 
right; the spirit of liberty is the spirit which seeks to understand 
the mind of other men and women; the spirit of liberty is the spirit 
which weighs their interests alongside its own without bias .... 168 
It appears that direct democracy, at least in the twenty-six states that 
currently practice it, is here to stay. And allowing citizens to act as 
lawmakers is not necessarily or always undesirable-with one essential 
qualification: the exercise of raw majority power must be subject to the 
scrutiny of a robust and independent judiciary. To the extent that citizens 
reject on principle the need for a counter-majoritarian force, the continued 
expansion of direct democracy poses a clear threat to those outside the 
American mainstream. 
statement, "[Clourt opinions should be in line with voters' values, and judges who repeatedly 
ignore those values should be impeached." Id. 
168. Judge Learned Hand, Address at "I Am an American Day" Ceremony, N.Y., N.Y. (May 
21, 1944), available at http://www.criminaljustice.org/public.nsflENews/2002e67?opendocument 
(last visited Apr. 26, 2(06). 
